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ARTICLES 
The Possibility of Practical Reason* 
J. David Velleman 
Suppose that reasons for someone to do something must be considera- 
tions that would sway him toward doing it if he entertained them 
rationally.' And suppose that the only considerations capable of sway- 
ing someone toward an action are those which represent it as a way 
of attaining something he wants, or would want once apprised of its 
attainability.2 These assumptions, taken together, seem to imply that 
* I am grateful to Sonja Al-Sofi, Stephen Darwall, Jennifer Church, Paul Boghos- 
sian, Alfred Mele, Elijah Millgram, Derek Parfit, Peter Railton, Sigrun Svavarsdottir, 
Nicholas White, Bernard Williams, Stephen Yablo, and several anonymous referees for 
helpful discussions of the issues raised in this article. Earlier versions of the paper were 
presented to the philosophy departments at New York University, Stanford University, 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Houston; and 
to the philosophy faculty colloquium at the University of Michigan. Some of the material 
was also presented to Michael Bratman's 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities 
seminar on intention. I have benefited from comments received on all of these occasions, 
especially the comments of Frances Kamm, Fred Dretske, Rachel Cohon, Allan Gibbard, 
Sally Haslanger, David Hills, Tomis Kapitan, Jeff McMahan, Patrick Hays, and David 
Phillips. Finally, I received many helpful comments from participants in a graduate 
seminar taught at the University of Michigan in the winter of 1993. Work on this 
article was supported by the Edna Balz Lacy Faculty Fellowship at the Institute for the 
Humanities, University of Michigan. 
1. This principle is meant to apply only to complete sets of reasons, not to reasons 
taken individually. That is, if a particular consideration counts as a reason only in the 
context of a larger set or series of considerations, then it need not be capable of swaying 
the agent unless it is considered in that context. The assumption that 'reasons' denotes 
complete sets of reasons will be in force throughout the following discussion. I shall 
also rely on the success-grammar of the word 'considerations': considerations are, by 
implication, true considerations-or, as I shall sometimes call them, facts. 
2. The last clause is meant to account for cases like this: "It may be true of me 
that were the aroma of fresh apple pie to waft past my nose I would be moved to 
discover its source and perhaps to try to wangle a piece. It does not follow from this, 
however, that before I smell the pie I desire to eat it or to eat anything at all" (Stephen 
L. Darwall, Impartial Reason [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983], p. 40). Here 
apple pie is something that the agent doesn't yet want but will want once he considers 
its attainability, and so considerations about how to obtain it are capable of influencing 
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the only considerations that can qualify as reasons for someone to act 
are considerations appealing to his antecedent inclinations3-that is, 
his desires or dispositions to desire.4 
This conclusion amounts to an admission that reason really is, as 
Hume put it, the slave of the passions,5 and Hume's conclusion is one 
that many philosophers hope to avoid. Some try to avoid the conclu- 
sion by rejecting one of the premises from which it appears to follow.6 
Others prefer to keep the premises while arguing that the conclusion 
doesn't actually follow from them.7 
In my view, the question whether reasons do or do not depend on 
an agent's inclinations should simply be rejected, because it embodies a 
false dichotomy. This dichotomy has recently come to be formulated 
in terms introduced by Bernard Williams.8 In Williams's terminology, 
him in the requisite way. I take it that this mechanism is what David Hume regarded 
as the first of the two ways in which reason can influence action: "Reason ... can have 
an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by 
informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it 
discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any 
passion" (A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon, 
1978], p. 459). 
3. Note that I am not using the word 'inclination' in its Kantian sense. I am using 
it as the generic term for conative or motivational states of all kinds. 
4. The argument presented here is discussed at length in Darwall, Impartial Reason, 
esp. chaps. 2 and 5. 
5. Hume, p. 415. I do not claim that the argument offered above for Hume's 
conclusion should necessarily be attributed to Hume. 
6. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes 
called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of 
Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970);John McDowell, "Are Moral 
Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 
ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External 
Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assump- 
tion, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; 
and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reason- 
ing," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, 
although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral 
requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation 
and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. 
Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, 
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), chap. 3. 
7. See Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason,"Journal of Philoso- 
phy 83 (1986): 5-25. 
8. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101 - 13; "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity 
of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45; "Replies," in World, Mind, and Ethics; Essays 
on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185-224. 
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"internal" reasons are those which count as reasons for someone only 
by virtue of his antecedent inclinations; "external" reasons are those 
which count as reasons for someone independently of his inclinations.9 
The Humean conclusion implies that all reasons are internal, in this 
sense, and it is therefore called internalism; its denial is called exter- 
nalism.'0 My thesis is that we do not in fact have to choose between 
the two. 
* * * 
Christine Korsgaard has pointed out that the foregoing argument 
doesn't necessarily yield any constraint on what counts as a reason 
for acting." It may instead yield a constraint on who counts as a 
rational agent. 
9. Here I am choosing one of two possible readings that have occasioned consider- 
able confusion in the literature. The confusion can be traced to the casual manner in 
which Williams introduces the term 'internal reason'. Williams carefully defines what 
he calls the "internal interpretation" of the statement "A has reason to k." Interpreted 
internally, the statement implies that A has some motive that can be served by his 4)- 
ing. Williams then says "I shall also for convenience refer sometimes to 'internal reasons' 
and 'external reasons"' ("Internal and External Reasons," p. 101). But Williams never 
explains how a scheme for interpreting reason-attributions can be transformed into a 
scheme for classifying reasons themselves. 
Two different schemes of classification have suggested themselves to philosophers 
writing in this area. One scheme classifies as internal any reason that can engage one 
of the agent's motives so as to sway him toward doing that for which it is a reason. The 
other scheme classifies as internal only those reasons whose status as reasons depends 
on their capacity to engage the agent's motives in this way. An internal reason, on this 
latter scheme, is one that wouldn't be a reason if the agent didn't have a motive that 
it could engage. The difference between these schemes of classification can be illustrated 
by the case of an agent who has both a reason and a corresponding motive. According 
to the first scheme, this reason is definitely internal, since the agent has a motive 
corresponding to it. According to the second scheme, however, this reason could still 
be external, if it would remain a reason for the agent whether or not he had the motive. 
Only the latter scheme captures the entailment that distinguishes Williams's "inter- 
nal interpretation" of reason-attributions. For on the former scheme, the agent's having 
a reason doesn't require him to have a motive. If he lacks a corresponding motive, then 
his reason doesn't necessarily cease to be a reason, on this scheme; it simply ceases to 
be internal. Yet under the internal interpretation of reason-attributions, the agent must 
have the motive in order for it to be true that he has a reason at all. I therefore prefer 
the latter scheme of classification. 
10. Note that this usage differs somewhat from that of other philosophers, for 
whom the term 'internalism' refers to our first premise, requiring reasons to have the 
capacity of exerting an influence. 
11. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Will- 
iams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism 
about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin 
Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 
6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 
42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, 
eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 
30 (1996): 197-220. 
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The first premise of our argument doesn't entail that if a consider- 
ation fails to influence someone, then it isn't a reason for him to act; 
it entails that if a consideration fails to influence someone, then either 
it isn't a reason for him to act or he hasn't entertained it rationally. 
The inclinations that would make an agent susceptible to the influence 
of some consideration may therefore be necessary-not to the consid- 
eration's being a reason for him-but rather to his being rational in 
entertaining that reason. And our premises may consequently imply 
that an agent's inclinations determine, not what he has reason for 
doing, but whether he is rational in his response to the reasons he has. 
Korsgaard favors the latter conclusion over the former.12 In deny- 
ing the dependence of reasons on inclinations, she qualifies as an 
externalist, in Williams's terminology."3 
Korsgaard's critique of Williams suggests a version of externalism 
that goes something like this."4 Being a rational agent entails having 
12. See also Michael Smith, "Reason and Desire," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
88 (1988): 243-58. Smith seems to think (pp. 248-52) that he and Korsgaard disagree, 
but I think that they don't. In particular, Smith believes that Korsgaard rejects the 
second premise, that considerations can influence an agent only in conjunction with 
his conative attitudes. But I don't interpret Korsgaard as rejecting this premise. Kors- 
gaard never claims that a consideration, or belief, can move an agent without the help 
of a conation or motive; what she claims, I think, is that the desires and values mediating 
the influence of a consideration need not be ordinary motives, of the sort that are 
directed at the agent's ends, since they can instead constitute his virtue of rationality. 
Williams responds to this argument but seems to misunderstand it. He seems to 
think that if all rational agents have, say, a motive for doing what's right, then the fact 
that an action is right will turn out to be an internal reason for them, after all: "If this 
is so, then the constraints of morality are part of everybody's [motivational set], and every 
correct moral reason will be an internal reason" ("Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of 
Blame," p. 37). But here Williams adopts a sense of the phrase 'internal reason' that fails 
to capture his own "internal interpretation" of reason-attributions, as I have explained in 
n. 9, above. In this sense, an internal reason is one with the capacity to engage an 
agent's motives, but not necessarily one whose very status as a reason depends upon 
that capacity. 
I believe that Korsgaard is working with the alternative (and, to my mind, prefera- 
ble) sense of 'internal reason', according to which an internal reason is one whose status 
as a reason depends on its capacity to engage the agent's motives. And what Korsgaard 
envisions is that reasons for behaving morally will qualify as reasons whether or not 
people have motives that such reasons can engage. Even if people happen to have the 
relevant motives, reasons for behaving morally will still be independent of them, in 
Korsgaard's view, and such reasons should be classified as external. 
For a misinterpretation similar to Williams's, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 85, n. 33. 
13. I do not mean that Korsgaard would call herself an externalist, since she uses 
the term in a somewhat different sense. See n. 10 above. 
14. I don't mean to claim that Korsgaard holds this version of externalism. Kors- 
gaard's "Skepticism about Practical Reason" seems designed to be independent, in many 
respects, of her larger metaethical project. It therefore leaves open various versions of 
externalism that Korsgaard herself would not necessarily endorse. Indeed, I suspect 
that the version of externalism discussed here in the text corresponds to what Korsgaard 
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various motives, including a preference for one's own greater good'5 
and an acceptance of moral principles.16 A rational agent is influenced 
by a reason for doing something when, for example, he considers some 
respect in which doing it is morally required; and this consideration can 
influence him because an inclination to abide by moral requirements 
is partly constitutive of his rationality. If an agent lacks this inclination, 
its absence won't prevent him from having moral reasons for acting: 
moral requirements will still count as reasons for him to act. Rather, 
lacking an inclination to abide by moral requirements will render the 
agent irrational, by making him insensitive to this particular kind 
of reason. 
THE EXTERNALIST'S BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION 
One liability of this model is that it must identify particular features 
of an action as constitutive of reasons for taking it, whether an agent 
cares about them or not, and it must then criticize an agent as irrational 
if he should fail to care about those features. The model thus incorpo- 
rates specific normative judgments, to the effect that one ought to be 
inclined toward courses of action with the features in question. 
What entitles the externalist to build these normative judgments 
into his model of practical reason? As Williams puts it, "Someone who 
claims the constraints of morality are themselves built into the notion 
of what it is to be a rational deliberator cannot get that conclusion 
for nothing."'17 
Korsgaard does not try to get this conclusion for nothing, how- 
ever. On the contrary, she insists that the normative judgments built 
into her conception of practical reason will require an "ultimate justi- 
fication," which the externalist hopes to provide.' Indeed, the possibil- 
ity of such a justification is the centerpiece of her paper. 
Korsgaard's quarrel with Williams, after all, is that he prematurely 
discounts the possibility ofjustifying externalism. In assuming that an 
agent's imperviousness to a consideration impugns its status as a rea- 
son, rather than the agent's rationality, Williams assumes that its status 
as a reason cannot be established independently. For if a consideration 
could be certified as a reason for someone irrespective of whether he's 
susceptible to it, then his lack of susceptibility would thereby come to 
impugn his rationality instead. Yet certifying something as a reason 
rejects under the label "dogmatic rationalism" in "The Normativity of Instrumental 
Reason," in Value and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, in press). 
15. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," p. 18. 
16. Ibid., p. 22. 
17. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37. 
18. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," p. 22. 
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for someone irrespective of his susceptibilities would amount to 
showing that it is an external reason, and hence that externalism is 
true. When Williams presupposes the impossibility of such a show- 
ing, he is presupposing the impossibility of justifying externalism. 
His case for internalism thus rests on antecedent skepticism about 
the alternative. 
So Korsgaard argues-cogently, I believe. Yet even if she is right 
that the case for internalism rests on skepticism about externalism, 
the question remains whether we aren't entitled to be skeptical. What 
are the prospects for showing that something is a reason for someone 
whether or not he has the inclinations to which it would appeal? How 
will the externalist demonstrate that there are considerations by which 
any agent ought to be moved? 
* * * 
One might think that an externalist could avoid this burden of justifi- 
cation by avoiding the identification of any particular considerations 
as reasons, or of any particular inclinations as rational. But I doubt 
whether this strategy can work. 
The version of externalism outlined above incurs a burden of 
justification because it judges an agent to be irrational unless he is 
inclined to be swayed by particular, substantive features of actions, 
whose value or importance may be open to question. All that exter- 
nalism needs to say, however, is that the inclination responsible for 
the influence of reasons is one that's essential for the agent's rationality. 
Does this inclination have to be an inclination to be swayed by particu- 
lar considerations, specified by their substance? Maybe it can be an 
inclination to do whatever is supported by reasons as such, or whatever 
is rational as such. 
The inclination that's now being proposed isn't an inclination to 
do things with any particular features, other than the feature of being 
favored by reasons (whatever they may consist in) or the feature of 
being rational (whatever that is). Hence the claim that this inclination 
is essential to an agent's rationality doesn't call for any justification. 
For how could rationality fail to require an inclination to do what's 
rational, or what's favored by reasons? 
* * * 
Unfortunately, this version of externalism doesn't ultimately succeed 
in shedding the burden of justification, since it doesn't avoid the need 
to specify what counts as a reason or a rational action. To be sure, all 
it requires of a rational agent is that he be inclined to act in accordance 
with reasons or rationality as such. But in order for reasons to influence 
an agent by way of this inclination, he must recognize them as reasons, 
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or as evidence of rationality, and so he needs some criterion of what 
counts as a reason or as a rational action. And until such a criterion 
is supplied, the proposed version of externalism will be nothing but 
the trivial assertion that rationality is a disposition to be influenced 
by reasons. 
What's needed to save this version of externalism from triviality 
is a criterion specifying what it is about an action that makes it rational 
or constitutes a reason for taking it. And this criterion will once again 
require justification. 
At this point, the externalist may attempt to repeat his earlier 
evasive maneuver. He is committed to the existence of a criterion by 
which an agent can recognize reasons or rational actions; but is he 
committed to its being a substantive criterion, which would have to 
be justified? Maybe an agent can recognize reasons or rational actions 
by their satisfying the generic concepts of what it is to be a reason or 
a rational action as such.'9 
Yet this strategy of continually postponing controversy is unlikely 
to help. Asking the agent to identify a rational action under the guise 
of rationality as such, or to identify a reason for acting under the guise 
of a reason as such, would be somewhat like asking him to hunt for 
something described only as "the quarry," or to play a game with an 
eye to something described only as "winning." It would be to assign 
him a task with a formal object but no substantive object-and hence 
with no object at all. 
THE OBJECT OF PRACTICAL REASONING 
The formal object of an enterprise is a goal stated solely in terms of, 
or in terms that depend on, the very concept of being the object of 
that enterprise.20 Thus, for example, winning is the formal object of 
a competitive game, since "winning" just is the concept of succeeding 
in competition. Similarly, the formal object of a search or hunt is the 
quarry, and the formal object of a question is the answer. 
Any enterprise that has a formal object must have a substantive 
object as well-that is, a goal that is not stated solely in terms that 
19. I believe that Korsgaard proposes this very strategy ("Skepticism about Practical 
Reason," pp. 30-31). And I believe that there may be a way-a distinctively Kantian 
way-of making the strategy work. I discuss this Kantian version of the strategy briefly 
in n. 25, below. Note, then, that the present argument does not purport to prove that 
the strategy in question is unworkable. It's meant to justify doubts about the strategy, 
by showing just how difficult it will be to carry out. 
20. I suspect that the argument offered in this section is related to the argument 
offered by Williams on pp. 109-10 of "Internal and External Reasons." Because I don't 
fully understand the relevant passage, however, I hesitate to attribute the argument 
to Williams. 
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depend on the concept of being the object of that enterprise.2' In the 
case of a competitive game, there must be a substantive object of the 
game, something that constitutes winning but cannot simply consist 
in winning, so described. A game whose object was specifiable only as 
"winning" wouldn't have an object-that is, wouldn't have any object 
in particular. And if a game had no particular object, then there would 
be no such thing as winning it, and so it wouldn't be a fully constituted 
competitive game. Similarly, a hunt whose object was specifiable only 
as "the quarry" wouldn't be a fully constituted search, and the question 
"What is the answer?" isn't by itself a fully constituted question. 
* * * 
Since practical reasoning is an enterprise at which one can succeed or 
fail, it must have an object against which success or failure can be 
measured. What, then, is the object of practical reasoning? 
One might suggest that practical reasoning has the object of figur- 
ing out what to do, or answering the question "What shall I do?" But 
this suggestion either misstates the object of practical reasoning or 
states it in merely formal terms. 
The statement that practical reasoning has the object of figuring 
out what to do may simply mean that it has the object of arriving at 
something to do or of issuing in an action. So interpreted, however, 
the statement is mistaken, since issuing in an action-some action or 
other-is not the object of practical reasoning. Issuing in an action 
may be what makes reasoning practical, but the object of such reason- 
ing is, not to issue in just any action, but to issue in some actions 
rather than others. 
The object of practical reasoning must therefore be to arrive at 
a privileged action or an action in some privileged class. And when 
"figuring out what to do" is interpreted as expressing this object, it 
turns out to be a merely formal specification, since "what to do," so 
interpreted, simply means the correct or privileged thing to do, the 
thing whose discovery is being attempted. Hence there must be a 
further, substantive specification of the action or kind of action that 
practical reasoning aims to identify. A mode of reasoning whose goal 
was specified solely as "figuring out what to do" would be like a search 
21. The distinction between the formal and substantive aims of practical reason is 
discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 3, 9, 
37. As David Gauthier has pointed out ("Rationality and the Rational Aim," in Reading 
Patfit, ed. Jonathan Dancy [in press]), Parfit is less than clear on the relation between 
these aims; in particular, Parfit doesn't appear to believe that the substantive aim of 
practical reason, as identified by a particular theory, is a specification of the formal aim. 
Like Gauthier, I prefer to use the phrase 'substantive aim' for that which specifies what 
it is to achieve the formal aim. 
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whose object was specified solely as "figuring out where to look," 
or a question whose object was specified solely as "figuring out how 
to reply." 
Similar remarks apply to the notion that practical reasoning aims 
at figuring out the best thing to do.22 This notion is correct if 'the best 
thing to do' means "the privileged action"-that is, the action that 
uniquely satisfies the standard of success for this very reasoning. But 
in that case, it merely expresses the formal object of the enterprise. 
There can be an enterprise of figuring out the best thing to do, in 
this sense, only if that enterprise also has a substantive standard of 
success, just as there can be an enterprise of figuring out the best way 
to reply only if there is a substantive question, and there can be an 
enterprise of figuring out the best place to look only if there is a 
substantive quarry. 
Of course, 'the best thing to do' might be interpreted, alternatively, 
as already expressing a substantive value: it might mean, for example, 
"the action that's optimific," in the sense that it contributes most to the 
agent's welfare or to the welfare of everyone. But in that case, the notion 
that practical reasoning aims to figure out the best thing to do will once 
again express a value judgment that calls for justification. 
* * * 
What, then, about rational action or reasons for acting? Can the object 
of practical reasoning be to identify a rational thing to do, or a thing 
that one has reason for doing? 
The concepts of rational action and reasons for acting are poten- 
tially confusing in that they can have both generic and specific uses. 
If we specify a substantive kind of action as the object of practical 
reasoning, then we can grant it the honorific "rational," so that the 
phrase 'rational action' names actions of the specified kind. Similarly, 
if we specify substantive features that practical reasoning looks for in 
an action, we can grant the honorific "reasons for acting" to those 
features. Practical reasoning will then turn out to aim at the rational 
thing to do, or at what there is reason for doing, but only because 
'rational' and 'reasons' are names for substantive objects. 
What cannot be the aim of practical reasoning is rational action 
merely as such-that is, action conceived as rational in the generic 
sense, rather than in a sense defined by a specific standard. The generic 
concept of rational action is just the concept of action that would issue 
from competent practical reasoning. Until there is something that 
22. This notion is, for example, the basis of Donald Davidson's conception of 
practical reasoning. See his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). The 
problems mentioned here are discussed further in the text accompanying n. 45 below. 
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counts as competence in practical reasoning, nothing counts as a ratio- 
nal action in the generic sense. And competence in practical reasoning 
can be defined only in relation to the object of the enterprise, since 
competence is a disposition toward success. To be indicative of compe- 
tent practical reasoning is to be indicative of practical reasoning that's 
well suited to achieving its object. Defining the object of practical 
reasoning as action that's rational in this sense would thus be to string 
definitions in a circle, leaving the object of practical reasoning still 
undefined. It would be like trying to teach someone a game by telling 
him that the object was to make a competent showing; whereas what 
counts as a competent showing always depends on the substantive 
object of the game.23 
Similarly, the sole aim of practical reasoning cannot be action 
supported by reasons merely as such-that is, reasons conceived under 
the generic concept expressing what it is to be a reason. The generic 
concept of a reason for acting is the concept of something that warrants 
or justifies action. And to justify something is to show or indicate it to 
be just-that is, in accordance with ajus, or rule of correctness. Until 
there is something that constitutes a correct conclusion or a correct 
inference, there can be nothing that constitutes justifying a conclusion 
or an inference, and so there can be nothing that constitutes a reason 
for a conclusion or an inference, in the generic sense. So, too, until 
there is something that constitutes correctness in actions, or in out- 
comes of practical reasoning, there can be nothing that satisfies the 
generic concept of ajustification for action, or ajustification in practi- 
cal reasoning; and so there can be nothing that satisfies the generic 
concept of a reason for acting. 
JUSTIFYING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTION OF REASONS 
This argument suggests that the externalist cannot indefinitely post- 
pone giving substantive characterizations of rationality or reasons. 
The externalist must at some point provide practical reasoning with 
a substantive standard of success, which will either consist in or give 
rise to a substantive account of the features that constitute reasons 
for an action. The externalist will then have to justify his normative 
judgment that an agent ought to be swayed by consideration of the 
specified features.24 
23. Of course, we could introduce a substantive conception of competent practical 
reasoning-a substantively specified procedure, adherence to which constitutes good 
reasoning. In that case, however, the definition of rational action as that which would 
issue from competent practical reasoning will become a substantive concept, which once 
again requires justification. 
24. The notion that practical reasoning is framed by a criterion of success for 
actions is discussed by David Gauthier in "Assure and Threaten," Ethics 104 (1994): 
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What's more, the requisite justification is unlikely to emerge from 
an analysis of concepts such as "reason" or "rational action." As we 
have seen, these are formal concepts that have no application except 
in relation to a substantive object or standard of success. Because these 
concepts implicitly require such a standard to be supplied, we can 
hardly expect to deduce it from them, any more than we should 
expect to deduce the object of a game from the mere concept of 
winning, or the object of a hunt from the mere concept of a quarry.25 
I cannot prove that the task ofjustifying an externalist conception 
of reasons is impossible, but I think it's going to be awfully hard. I'm 
just a fainthearted externalist, I guess. Being fainthearted, however, 
I want to consider whether the benefits of externalism can be obtained 
without the burdens. I shall therefore turn to an alternative conception 
of practical reason, which straddles the line between internalism 
and externalism. 
OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't 
relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to 
identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter 
and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, de- 
pending on their inclinations. 
One way to frame such a conception is to name some features 
that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for 
someone whether or not he is inclined to care about them. The prob- 
lem with the resulting conception, as we have seen, is that it entails 
the normative judgment that one ought to be inclined to care about 
the specified features, on pain of irrationality, and this normative 
judgment requires justification. 
The advantage of internalism is that it avoids these normative 
commitments.26 It says that things count as reasons for someone only 
690-721. I discuss Gauthier's treatment of this notion in my "Deciding How to Decide," 
in Cullity and Gaut, eds. 
25. Kant's conception of practical reason, as I understand it, is an attempt to 
circumvent this problem, by using the concept of a reason, not to identify which features 
are reasons, but rather to identify which features aren't, and by replacing the rule of 
acting for reasons with a rule of not acting for nonreasons. On Kant's conception, as 
I understand it, the object of practical reasoning is to act on any consideration but one 
whose being a reason would entail a contradiction. It's like a hunt whose object is to 
locate anything but that which could not possibly be a quarry. Perhaps the generic 
concepts of a quarry or a reason can indeed serve this modest role. 
26. I don't mean to imply that internalism avoids all normative commitments. In 
"Skepticism about Practical Reason," Korsgaard suggests that the instrumental principle 
of adopting the means to one's ends is a substantive norm; she defends this point at 
length in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason." But even if internalism has to 
justify requiring us to care about the means to what we already care about, it avoids 
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if he is inclined to care about them, and so it leaves the normative 
question of whether to care about them entirely open. Yet if we try 
to leave this question open, by defining things as reasons only for 
those inclined to care about them, we'll end up with a definition that's 
relativized to the inclinations of particular agents-won't we? 
Not necessarily. For suppose that all reasons for acting are fea- 
tures of a single kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination. 
And suppose that the inclination on which the influence of reasons 
depends is, not an inclination that distinguishes some agents from 
others, but rather an inclination that distinguishes agents from non- 
agents. In that case, to say that these features count as reasons only 
for those who are inclined to care about them will be to say that they 
count as reasons only for agents-which will be to say no less than 
that they are reasons for acting, period, since applying only to agents 
is already part of the concept of reasons for acting. The restriction 
on the application of reasons will drop away from our definition, since 
it restricts their application, not to some proper subset of agents, but 
rather to the set of all agents, which is simply the universe of applica- 
tion for reasons to act. 
* * * 
The foregoing paragraph is an outline for a conception of reasons 
for acting-a bare outline that needs filling in. The remainder of this 
article will be devoted to filling it in, at least to some extent, though 
not, I admit, to the extent that's needed. I shall begin by making a 
digression into the subject of theoretical reasoning. My hope is that we 
can understand reasons for acting by analogy with reasons for belief.27 
The nature of reasons for belief, and the inclination that mediates 
their influence, are fairly clear. The object of theoretical reasoning is 
to arrive at true belief;28 and since true belief needn't be defined in 
the further and heavier burden of justifying any requirements to care about particu- 
lar things. 
27. The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is being pursued indepen- 
dently by my colleague Peter Railton, with somewhat different results. See his "What 
the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in Reality, 
Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300, pp. 292 ff.; "A Kind of Nonsubjective Reason?" 
in Essays in Honor of Kurt Baier, ed. J. Schneewind (New York: Open Court, in press); 
and "On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about Action," in Cullity 
and Gaut, eds. David Gauthier also discusses the analogy, but he ultimately rejects it 
("Assure and Threaten," pp. 699-702). 
28. Some may be inclined to think that the object of theoretical reasoning is not 
true belief but empirically adequate and explanatorily fruitful belief, or belief of some 
other kind. My argument doesn't depend on the outcome of this disagreement. What 
matters for my purposes is that theoretical reasoning aims at some outcome specified 
substantively (i.e.. not in terms of its being the object of theoretical reasoning or belief). 
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terms of success in theoretical reasoning, it constitutes a substantive 
rather than formal standard of success.29 Reasons for a particular belief 
are recognized by their perceived relevance to this substantive standard 
of success, as considerations that appear to guarantee or probability 
the truth of the belief.30 And these considerations influence a person's 
beliefs by virtue of an inclination to believe what seems true. Here, 
then, are considerations of a single kind and a single inclination to 
mediate their influence. 
Perhaps we should ask whether the absence of this inclination 
would undermine the existence of reasons for belief or would alterna- 
tively undermine the believer's claim to rationality.3" The answer to 
this question would determine whether reasons for belief were internal 
or external reasons. If someone weren't inclined to believe what 
seemed true, would signs of truth in a proposition no longer count 
as reasons for him to believe it? Or would he no longer qualify as a 
rational believer? 
* * * 
Both, I think-which goes to show that the question incorporates a false 
dichotomy. I shall argue that the dichotomy should be replaced with a 
subtler account of theoretical reasoning, along the following lines. 
If someone isn't inclined to believe what seems true on a topic, 
he is no longer subject to reasons for believing things about it; but he 
is no longer subject to reasons for belief about it, I shall argue, because 
he is no longer a believer about it at all, and a fortiori no longer a 
rational believer.32 He isn't in the business of forming beliefs on the 
29. The claim that truth isn't defined in terms of success in theoretical reasoning 
is potentially controversial. It must be rejected by those who hold a pragmatist concep- 
tion of truth as the eventual deliverance of rational inquiry. In my view, however, the 
pragmatist conception renders theoretical reasoning vacuous, like a game whose only 
object is winning. 
30. In the case of inductive reasoning, of course, we may have trouble saying what 
relevance reasons have to the truth of a belief. Nevertheless, such reasons count as 
reasons for a belief because they make it seem true, even if we cannot say how or why. 
(An alternative way of handling this case would be to point out that inductive reasons 
satisfy a substantive procedural criterion of correctness in inductive inference. See n. 
23 above.) 
31. Williams raises this question and seems to suggest that the absence of an 
inclination toward the truth would undermine the existence of reasons for belief ("Inter- 
nal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37). This is, of course, the internalist 
answer to the question. 
32. I believe that Korsgaard makes a similar point ("The Normativity of Instrumen- 
tal Reason," p. 42). In passages such as this, where Korsgaard seems to be pursuing a 
strategy like the one I am developing here, I begin to doubt whether she really is an 
externalist, in Williams's sense of the term. My reasons for this doubt will be explained 
in the text, below, when I explain why I do not regard the present strategy as a version 
of externalism. 
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topic, to begin with, unless he is inclined to believe what seems true 
about it. 
Thus, reasons for believing something apply only to those who 
are inclined to believe what seems true on the topic, and so they are 
like internal reasons; but to say that they are reasons only for those 
who are so inclined is just to say that they are reasons only for potential 
believers on the topic-which is to say no less than that they are 
reasons for believing, period. Reasons for belief can therefore be iden- 
tified independently of the inclinations of individuals, and so they are 
like external reasons, too. 
The foregoing paragraph is a bare outline for an account of 
theoretical reasoning, and this outline also needs filling in. In order 
to fill it in, I shall have to explore the sense in which being inclined 
toward the truth is essential to being a subject of belief. I therefore 
turn to a different thesis associated with the name of Bernard Williams, 
the thesis that belief is an attitude that "aims at the truth."33 
THE CONSTITUTIVE AIM OF BELIEF 
The grounds for this thesis emerge when we try to distinguish belief 
from the other propositional attitudes. One difference between belief 
and other attitudes is that it entails regarding its propositional object 
as true. 
The difference between believing that P and desiring that P. for 
example, is that the former attitude treats P as a report of how things 
are, whereas the latter treats P as a mandate for how things are to 
become.34 Desire takes its propositional object as representingfaci- 
enda-things that aren't the case but are to be brought about. By 
contrast, belief takes its propositional object as representingfacta- 
things that are the case and in virtue of which the proposition is true.35 
33. Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 136-51. 
34. This difference between belief and desire can be obscured by the fact that 
desiring that P entails desiring P to be true, just as believing that P entails believing it 
to be true. These locutions obscure the difference between belief and desire because 
they use the infinitive 'to be', which is required for indirect discourse, to replace what 
would be different moods of the copula in direct speech. In believing P to be true, one 
believes in its completed truth, as would be expressed by the indicative statement that 
P is true; whereas in desiring P to be true, one desires its to-be-completed truth, as 
would be expressed by the optative that it be true. Thus, although we can speak either 
of believing or of desiring P to be true, transposing these statements from oratio obliqua 
to oratio recta reveals an underlying difference in the relation that P is taken as bearing 
to the world. 
35. The language used in this contrast should not be overinterpreted. To say that 
belief involves regarding a proposition as true, or that desire involves regarding it as 
to be made true, is simply to articulate our concepts of belief and desire as propositional 
attitudes. We express the fundamental similarity among these content-bearing mental 
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* * * 
This conception of belief is correct as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far 
enough. It's incomplete because regarding a proposition as true is in- 
volved in many cognitive attitudes, including not only belief but also 
other attitudes from which belief must still be distinguished. Assuming 
a proposition-say, for the sake of argument-entails regarding it as a 
report rather than a mandate, as a truth rather than something to be 
made true. Even imagining that P entails regarding it as a completed 
rather than a to-be-completed truth. One hasn't imagined that P unless 
one has regarded P as reflecting how things are, and hence as true. Yet 
to assume that P or imagine that P is not to believe it, and so regarding 
a proposition as true must not be sufficient for belief.36 
Of course, there is a sense in which things that are merely assumed 
or imagined are not regarded as really true. But the relevant sense is 
not that they aren't regarded as true at all; it's rather that they are 
regarded as true but not really-regarded as true, that is, but not 
seriously or in earnest. What distinguishes a proposition's being be- 
lieved from its being assumed or imagined is the spirit in which it is 
regarded as true, whether tentatively or hypothetically, as in the case 
of assumption; fancifully, as in the case of imagination; or seriously, 
as in the case of belief. 
* * * 
What's the difference between seriously regarding a proposition as 
true and doing so in some other spirit? Here is the point at which 
belief is distinguished from other attitudes by its aim. 
states by describing them as ways of regarding propositional contents, and we express 
the differences among them by differentiating among the ways in which those contents 
can be regarded. The resulting locutions should not be understood as positing any 
particular mental architecture, least of all an inner eye that squints at propositions or 
raises its eyebrow at them so as to regard them in different ways. Rather, these locutions 
simply translate our terms for propositional attitudes into a common vocabulary, in 
which their similarities and differences can be clearly expressed. To say that belief 
entails regarding a proposition as true is therefore not to commit ourselves to any 
particular theory about which physical, neurological, or otherwise subdoxastic states 
make up the mental state of belief. It commits us only to a view about what such states 
must amount to if they are to constitute belief-namely, that they must amount to the 
state of regarding a proposition as true. For recent discussions of this phenomenon, 
commonly called "direction of fit," see Lloyd Humberstone, "Direction of Fit," Mind 
101 (1992): 59-83; and G. F. Schueler, "Pro-attitudes and Direction of Fit," Mind 100 
(1991): 277-81. Note that I understand direction of fit somewhat differently from these 
and other authors. For a fuller treatment of the differences, see my "The Guise of the 
Good," Nous 26 (1992): 3-26; and n. 55 below. 
36. For related discussions of the similarities and differences among these cognitive 
states, see Jennifer Church, "Judgment, Self-Consciousness, and Object Independence," 
American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 51-60; and Mark Leon, "Rationalising Be- 
lief," Philosophical Papers 21 (1992): 299-314. 
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The sense in which fantasies and assumptions aren't serious is 
that they entail regarding a proposition as true-or accepting the 
proposition, as I shall put it-without sensitivity to whether one is 
thereby accepting the truth. We assume a proposition when we regard 
it as true for the sake of thereby framing a possibility to be entertained 
in argument or inquiry and when we can therefore be said to accept 
it for polemical or heuristic purposes. We imagine a proposition when 
we regard it as true for the sake of thereby stimulating or vicariously 
satisfying our desires and when we can therefore be said to accept it 
for recreational or motivational purposes. But we believe a proposition 
when we regard it as true for the sake of thereby getting the truth 
right with respect to that proposition: to believe something is to accept 
it with the aim of doing so if and only if it really is true. 
Thus, the purpose or aim with which a proposition is regarded 
as true is partly constitutive of the resulting attitude toward the propo- 
sition. It determines whether the proposition is being accepted hypo- 
thetically, as in assumption; playfully, as in imagination; or seriously, 
as in belief. These attitudes can therefore be conceived as having two 
tiers. The first tier, which they share and by virtue of which they differ 
as a group from the conative attitudes, is the attitude of regarding a 
proposition as true-the attitude of bare acceptance. The second tier, 
in which the various cognitive attitudes differ among themselves, encom- 
passes the different aims with which a proposition can be accepted.37 
To say that our attitude toward a proposition is partly constituted 
by the aim or purpose with which we accept the proposition is not to 
say that the aim is itself an attitude of ours, or that acceptance is an 
action. This point cannot be overemphasized.38 Acceptance is a mental 
37. An example that can help to illustrate this conception of the propositional 
attitudes appears in Bernard Williams's discussion of "Imagination and the Self" (in 
Problems of the Self, pp. 29-31). Williams compares two men who imagine assassinating 
the Prime Minister in the person of Lord Salisbury. One man imagines assassinating 
the Prime Minister but falsely believes that Lord Salisbury occupies that position; the 
other man, who knows that Lord Salisbury isn't Prime Minister, nevertheless imagines 
him to be, while also imagining a similar assassination. "On the purely psychological 
level," Williams remarks, "the same visualisings, the same images, could surely occur 
in both cases. The difference lies rather in how the story is meant" (p. 31). According 
to my account, "how the story is meant" should be understood in terms of the aim with 
which it is regarded as true that Lord Salisbury is Prime Minister. Each subject includes 
this identification in his "story," and thereby regards it as true. But one subject regards 
it as true for the sake of correctly identifying the Prime Minister, whereas the other 
regards it as true for the sake of his own entertainment. 
38. The point will be lost on those who believe that any goal-directed movement, 
mental or physical, automatically qualifies as an intentional action. I reject this view, as 
will become clear on pp. 715 ff. My reasons for rejecting it are developed more fully 
in my "Guise of the Good" and "What Happens When Someone Acts?" Mind 101 
(1992): 461-81. In any case, the present account of belief will be misunderstood if 
aims are assumed to be necessarily agential. 
710 Ethics July 1996 
state whose aim may be emergent in the cognitive mechanisms by 
which that state is induced, sustained, and revised. For example, if 
our acceptance of a proposition is regulated by mechanisms per- 
forming their function of therein framing a possibility to be tested, 
then our acceptance may have a heuristic aim whether or not we 
have heuristic motives or take any action toward heuristic ends. 
Similarly, if our acceptance of a proposition is regulated by mecha- 
nisms performing their function of therein tracking the truth of 
the proposition, then it may have an epistemic aim whether or not 
we have or act on such an aim.39 In short, our acceptance of a 
proposition may be aimed at the truth by our cognitive faculties 
rather than ourselves. 
* * * 
This possibility suggests that one can have beliefs-aimed, as required, 
at the truth-while also being indifferent, at another level, to the 
truth of those beliefs. There are two ways of being indifferent to the 
truth, of which only one is an obstacle to believing. 
To begin with, I can accept a proposition in a manner indifferent 
to its truth, thereby forming an assumption or fantasy rather than a 
belief. I am not then proceeding with indifference to the truth of a 
belief; I'm proceeding with indifference to the truth of what I accept, 
thereby falling short of belief altogether. 
In another sense, however, I can be indifferent to the truth of 
something conceived as a belief. I cannot believe something without 
accepting it seriously-in an attempt, by me or my cognitive faculties, 
to arrive at acceptance of the truth-but I can still have further, 
second-order goals with respect to this attempt. For example, I can 
try to ensure that an attempt to accept what's true with respect to a 
proposition will lead to acceptance of that proposition whether it's 
true or not. This second-order attempt, to manipulate the outcome of 
a first-order attempt to accept what's true, is precisely what I undertake 
when I try to get myself to hold a particular belief irrespective of its 
truth. And in this case I am indifferent to the truth specifically of a 
39. As David Phillips has pointed out to me, the mechanisms whose function is to 
track the truth may employ assumptions or even fantasies along the way. Thus, whether 
a particular instance of acceptance is an hypothesis, fantasy, or belief cannot depend 
on the ultimate aim toward which it is directed. Rather, the nature of each acceptance 
must depend on its immediate aim, as I have tried to indicate with the words 'therein' 
and 'thereby': to assume that P is to accept P for the sake of thereby formulating a 
possibility to be tested, whereas to believe that P is to accept P for the sake of thereby 
accepting the truth with respect to P. (Peter Railton raises the same problem in his 
"Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief," Philosophical Issues 5 [1994]: 71-93.) 
Velleman Possibility of Practical Reason 711 
belief, because my indifference is directed at the success of something 
conceived as an attempt at accepting the truth.40 
* * * 
I can thus fail to care about the truth of my beliefs. Yet if indicators 
of truth in a proposition are reasons for believing it, then indifference 
to the truth of my beliefs would seem to leave me insensitive to reasons, 
and hence irrational. My conception of theoretical reason would thus 
seem to resemble externalist conceptions of practical reason, in man- 
dating a particular concern or inclination as required for rationality. 
But this appearance is misleading. The conception of reasons for 
belief as indicators of truth doesn't imply that indifference to the truth 
of my beliefs would be irrational. Indifference to the truth of my 
beliefs would not in fact make me insensitive to the associated reasons 
for believing. 
Of course, evidence for the truth of some belief may not sway me 
toward wanting or getting myself to hold that belief, if I'm indifferent 
to its truth. But we don't necessarily think that indicators of truth are 
reasons for such second-order measures as wanting or getting myself 
to hold beliefs. We identify them as reasons for believing, which are 
simply reasons for accepting something in the course of an attempt 
to arrive at acceptance of what's true. And insofar as I or my cognitive 
faculties attempt to arrive at the truth on a topic, that attempt will 
already make me potentially sensitive to indicators of the truth; 
whereas if no such attempt is in the works, the topic will be one on 
which I am not in the business of holding beliefs, in the first place. 
What provides my sensitivity to reasons for believing, then, is not 
a second-order aim of having true beliefs but rather the first-order 
aim that makes my acceptance of something into a belief. And if this 
first-order aim is lacking from my approach to some topic, then I am 
not irrationally insensitive to reasons for belief about it; I am out of 
the business of having beliefs about it altogether, and so I am no 
longer subject to reasons for belief about it at all. Thus, my conception 
of theoretical reason doesn't condemn this form of indifference as 
irrational, either. 
40. As Williams noted in "Deciding to Believe," this account of indifference to the 
truth of a belief explains the difficulty of acting on that indifference. In order to end 
up believing the proposition that I want to believe, I must accept it in the course of an 
attempt to accept what is true, not an attempt merely to accept this proposition. Indiffer- 
ence to the truth must not seep into my first-order attempt from my second-order 
attitude toward its success or failure. Some psychological partitioning is therefore neces- 
sary. On the difficulty of manipulating beliefs, see also Leon. 
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* * * 
In identifying something as a reason to believe a proposition, we are 
implicitly identifying it as a reason for a potential believer, someone 
who is in a position to believe or disbelieve the proposition at issue. 
Now, someone can be in a position to form a belief even though he 
lacks an interest in the truth of that belief-the second-order interest 
in the success of this attempt at accepting what's true. But he is not 
prepared to believe or disbelieve a proposition if he isn't prepared for 
an attempt to accept what's true with respect to it. Thus, he is not a 
potential believer with respect to a proposition-and hence not subject 
to reasons for believing it-in the absence of an inclination that would 
cause him to be swayed by indicators of its truth. 
So when we say that indicators of truth are reasons for belief, we 
aren't making a normative judgment about whether to be inclined 
toward the truth; we're saying that they're reasons for someone only 
if he is inclined toward the truth, since we're identifying them as 
reasons of a kind whose universe of application is the set of potential 
believers, who are constitutively truth inclined. The question whether 
to be inclined toward the truth on some topic-and hence whether 
to be subject to reasons for belief about it-is left entirely open. 
* * * 
In some sense, theoretical reasoning now seems to fit the model of 
internalism. Indicators of truth count as reasons for someone to believe 
only if he has a cognitive inclination that makes him susceptible to their 
influence. And reasons that apply to someone only if he's susceptible to 
their influence are supposed to be internal reasons. 
At this point, however, the distinction between internal and exter- 
nal reasons is out of its depth, so to speak. Reasons for belief are 
dependent on a particular inclination, all right, but they're dependent 
on that inclination which makes one a believer. They don't depend 
on one's peculiar inclinations as a believer-on one's second-order 
attitudes toward or preferences among beliefs. 
Indeed, the dependence of theoretical reasons on a cognitive incli- 
nation does not justify relativizing them to particular believers at all. 
The inclination on which these reasons depend is constitutive of belief 
itself, and to that extent they are reasons simplyfor belief rather than for 
any particular person to believe.4" If something counts in a particular 
epistemic context as a reason to believe that P. then it counts in that 
41. Of course, reasons for belief are also relative to an informational context, and 
insofar as different people are in possession of different information, they will be subject 
to different reasons. But if the informational context is held constant, the relativity of 
reasons to persons disappears. 
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context as a reason simply to believe that P. and not just for this or 
that believer to do so, since all potential believers of P are alike in the 
cognitive inclination that gives application to such a reason. 
The question of whether reasons for belief are internal or exter- 
nal reasons thus presents a false dichotomy. Reasons for belief are 
like internal reasons in that they exist and exert an influence only 
in relation to a particular inclination; but they are like external 
reasons in that the inclination on which they depend is embedded 
in the attitude of belief, so that they can count as reasons for belief 
per se, in abstraction from motivational differences among individ- 
ual believers. 
* * * 
Maybe the way to understand the status of reasons for belief is to 
consider an analogy between belief and another enterprise that's partly 
constituted by a substantive aim. Consider reasons for sacrificing a 
pawn in the game of chess. 
Reasons for sacrificing a pawn depend for their existence on a 
goal or aim, and in this respect they look like internal reasons. But 
the goal on which reasons for this move depend is partly constitutive 
of the move itself, because sacrificing a pawn is by definition a move 
in the game of chess, which is partly defined by its object; and because 
the move is by definition a sacrifice, which it can be only in relation 
to the object of the game. Reasons for sacrificing a pawn therefore 
exist in abstraction from the temperament of any particular player: 
they are reasons simply for the move itself, and in this respect they 
look like external reasons, too. 
A player may have second-order aims with respect to his success 
or failure in a particular game of chess. He may even have the goal 
of losing a game-if his opponent is a sensitive eight-year-old, for 
example. But in order to lose a game of chess, he must stay in the game, 
by continuing to pursue its object, however insincerely or ineffectually. 
And so long as he is pursuing that object, he will have the inclination 
that answers to reasons for sacrificing a pawn. 
A player can lose his susceptibility to those reasons only by giving 
up the associated object-moving his pieces around aimlessly, for 
example. In that case, he will in effect have quit the game: his oppo- 
nent will say, notjust "You're letting me win," but "You're not playing 
any more." Once the player has quit the game of chess, however, he 
has quit the only game in which pawns can be sacrificed, and his 
resulting insensitivity to reasons for sacrificing a pawn will not make 
him irrational. To someone who isn't playing chess, reasons for sacri- 
ficing a pawn simply don't apply. 
In sum, reasons for sacrificing a pawn apply to anyone with the 
capacity to do so, irrespective of his inclinations about how to exercise 
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that capacity. They apply to him only because he has an inclination 
that lends them an influence, of course, but the requisite inclination 
is the one that makes him a chess player, not one that determines his 
individual style of play. 
APPLYING THE ANALOGY TO PRACTICAL REASONING 
I think that practical reasoning occupies the same middle ground 
between internalism and externalism. That is, reasons for acting apply 
to someone only because he has an inclination that lends them an 
influence, but the requisite inclination is the one that makes him an 
agent, not one that determines his individual course of action. 
This account of practical reason simply follows the structure of 
theoretical reason, as analyzed above. That analysis began with the 
claim that belief is distinguished from other cognitive states by a 
substantive goal, and then it claimed that an inclination toward this 
goal creates the susceptibility necessary to the application of reasons 
for believing. Perhaps, then, action can be distinguished from other 
forms of behavior by a substantive goal, and an inclination toward 
this goal can create the susceptibility necessary to the application 
of reasons for acting. In that case, reasons for acting would be 
considerations relevant to the constitutive aim of action, just as 
reasons for believing are indicators of truth, which is the constitutive 
aim of belief. And anyone who wasn't susceptible to reasons for 
acting, because he had no inclination toward the relevant aim, 
wouldn't be in a position to act, anyway, and therefore wouldn't be 
subject to reasons for acting; just as anyone who has no inclination 
toward the truth isn't in a position to believe and isn't subject to 
reasons for belief. 
The account rests, of course, on the initial claim that behaviors 
qualify as actions by virtue of having a particular aim. Let me say a 
word about the philosophical point of such a claim. 
The point of specifying which behaviors qualify as actions is not, 
I think, to delineate the extension of 'action' or 'to act' as used in 
ordinary language. These terms are used quite loosely, in application 
not only to paradigm cases of action, in which human agency is exer- 
cised to its fullest, but also to marginal cases, in which agency is exer- 
cised only partially or imperfectly. The fundamental question in the 
philosophy of action is not how imperfect an exercise of agency can 
be while still qualifying as an action. The question is the nature of 
agency itself, and agency, like any capacity, fully reveals its nature 
only when fully exercised. We therefore want to know what makes 
for a paradigm case of action, a full-blooded action, an action par 
excellence. 
I claim that what makes for an action, in this sense, is a constitutive 
aim. This claim sounds odd, to say the least. We may think that a full- 
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blooded action must have some goal or other;42 but we tend to think 
that its status as an action doesn't depend on what goal it has. Action, 
we tend to think, is just behavior aimed at some goal, any goal. 
* * * 
In my opinion, however, we are mistaken in assuming that behavior 
approaches full-blooded action by having a goal of the sort that varies 
from one action to another. Simply being goal directed is not a mark 
of action. 
Consider a case of unintentional behavior. An old friend unex- 
pectedly walks into your office, and surprise lights up your face: your 
eyes widen, a smile flashes, an exclamation escapes your lips. These 
reactions just happen to you, and they may even hit you with an 
aftershock of surprise. Now suppose, instead, that you encounter your 
friend on the quad, recognizing him as he approaches. You are moved 
to the same reactions, but you now have a chance to modulate them 
or compose them into an intentional expression of surprise. 
Take another case of unintentional behavior. Say, a child acciden- 
tally brushes a glass off of the table, and your hand shoots out to catch 
it. Everything happens so fast that you see your hand catching the 
glass before you fully realize that the glass is falling. Now suppose, 
finally, that another child-an older and sassier child-hefts the glass 
with a smirk and calls, "Here, catch!" You then undertake the same 
behavior, but as a fully intentional action. 
The first instance in which you catch the glass is an instance of 
behavior directed at a goal, but it isn't a full-blooded exercise of your 
agency. Unlike your reflexive expression of surprise, which springs 
out of the emotion of surprise but not toward any purpose or goal, 
the reflexive extension of your hand is aimed at something-namely, 
preventing the glass from smashing on the floor.43 Despite being goal 
directed, however, this behavior still lacks some element that's neces- 
sary to full-blooded action. So what makes for action is not simply 
being goal directed. 
* * * 
The question is what's missing from this goal-directed behavior. In my 
view, what's missing is some additional goal that every action shares, no 
matter what its other, contingent goals may be. 
42. See, e.g., Jay Wallace, "How to Argue about Practical Reason," Mind 99 (1990): 
355-85, p. 359: "To act intentionally ... is necessarily to be in a goal-directed state"; 
see also Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation." 
43. The idea that some actions spring out of motives without being directed toward 
any ends or goals is defended by Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits 
of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,"Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65. 
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There is an ancient thesis along these lines, to the effect that 
action, no matter where it aims, must thereby aim at the good.44 This 
thesis identifies a constitutive goal of action-the good-and it thus 
implements the strategy of analysis that I favor. But in this implemen- 
tation, the strategy fails to achieve its purpose, since it doesn't avoid 
the twin pitfalls of internalism and externalism.45 
The thesis that action constitutively aims at the good can be inter- 
preted in at least two ways. It may simply mean that an action must 
aim at something, which consequently counts as good in the sense of 
being that whose attainment will make the action a success. But this 
sense of the word 'good' is a formal sense, denoting whatever is the 
aim of an action. It identifies no particular thing at which every action 
must aim, and hence no particular kind of consideration as capable of 
influencing anyone insofar as he is an agent. If the thesis uses this 
formal sense of the word 'good', then the considerations that it classifies 
as reasons will vary along with the good being aimed at. Reasons will 
then depend for their application on one's inclinations as an agent, as 
they do under internalism. 
In order to avoid this consequence of internalism, the ancient 
thesis would have to identify a substantive goal for action, by saying 
that every action aims at something conceived as good in a sense 
independent of its being the aim. But when the thesis uses a substantive 
sense of the word 'good' in this manner, it characterizes action as 
necessarily well-intentioned, thus ruling out various kinds of perver- 
sity. To those who believe, as I do, that behavior can still qualify as 
action even if its end-in-view is conceived as bad, the thesis will now 
appear to be burdened with controversial normative commitments, 
like the version of externalism considered above.46 
* * * 
The ancient thesis goes wrong, I think, in treating the constitutive 
aim of action as something shared or jointly promoted by all of an 
agent's other ends-in-view, as if it were an ultimate or all-encompassing 
end. If action is to be constituted by an aim, however, that aim cannot 
be an end at all. 
44. This view is echoed by Donald Davidson in "How Is Weakness of the Will 
Possible?" in Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 21-42, p. 22. 
45. This problem was foreshadowed in the text accompanying n. 22, above. 
46. In adopting an evil end, the perverse agent may of course be said to make evil 
his good, as Satan does in Paradise Lost (bk. 4, line 110). But Satan makes evil his good 
only in the formal sense that its attainment will be the criterion of his success. The fact 
that even Satan's actions aim at the good in this formal sense doesn't help us to identify 
a substantive aim that constitutes them as actions. G. E. M. Anscombe discusses this 
passage (Intention [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963], p. 75), and I have 
elsewhere criticized her discussion ("Guise of the Good," pp. 18 ff.). 
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An end is something conceived by an agent as a potential object 
of his actions. It is therefore something that one cannot have unless 
one already is an agent, in a position to act, and so it cannot be 
something that one must already have in order to occupy that position. 
If action is to be constituted by an aim, that aim must be, so to speak, 
subactional or subagential-something that a subject of mere behavior 
can have, and by having which he can become an agent, as his behavior 
becomes an action. 
This subactional aim can be discerned, I think, in our contrasting 
pairs of behaviors. It is that which the unintentional behaviors are 
missing in comparison with the corresponding full-blooded actions. 
* * * 
Intuitively speaking, what these behaviors lack is that, while directed 
at various things, they are not directed by you. When the glass is 
brushed off the table, for example, behavior aimed at arresting its fall 
is initiated and completed before you know it, and so you have no 
chance to take control of that behavior. In the intentional instance, the 
same goal-directed behavior occurs, but it occurs under your control. 
The kind of control at issue here is not the sensorimotor process 
that adjusts ongoing behavior in light of perceived progress toward a 
desired outcome. That process of real-time adjustment is simply eye- 
hand coordination, which occurs in both the intentional and the reflexive 
cases. What's missing from the reflexive case is conscious direction on 
your part, which is something other than eye-hand coordination. 
When goal-directed behavior proceeds under this conscious control, 
it becomes a full-blooded action, rather than a well-coordinated re- 
flex.47 And behavior that isn't directed at a goal can become an action 
in the same fashion. The smile that springs spontaneously from your 
emotion of surprise isn't aimed at any result, but it, too, can be trans- 
formed into a full-blooded action if it is brought under your con- 
scious control. 
Now, if an action comprises behavior of which you take control, 
then taking control of your behavior cannot itself be an action; other- 
wise, a vicious regress will ensue. Yet controlling your behavior is 
indeed an activity: it's something that you do. The reason why the 
falling glass leaves you no time to perform a full-blooded action is 
that, although it leaves you time to stick out your hand, it doesn't 
leave you time to do something else that's essential to a full-blooded 
47. I do not mean that every part or aspect of the behavior must come under your 
conscious control in order for the behavior to constitute a full-blooded action. How you 
execute the catch may still be left to those reflexes which make up your skill as a catcher; 
that you execute a catch, however, must come under your control, or the catch won't 
be an action in the fullest sense. 
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action-that is, to exercise conscious control of your catch. Hence 
when you catch the glass intentionally, you must be doing two things: 
extending your hand in order to avert a mishap and exercising control 
over that behavior. 
Let me reiterate that I am using the noun 'activity' and the verb 
'to do' in senses that do not imply the performance of a full-blooded 
action. To suggest that an action comprises behavior on which you 
perform the action of exercising control would be absurd. But you do 
many things that aren't actions-such as when you reflexively stick 
out your hand to catch a falling glass or smile out of surprise. And 
exercising conscious control over your behavior is indeed something 
that you do, in this thin sense of the verb. 
I therefore suggest that our ordinary concept of a full-blooded 
action is in fact the concept of two, hierarchically related activities. 
Action is like the corporate enterprise of work performed under man- 
agement: it's behavior executed under conscious control. And just as 
the corporate enterprise includes both a basic work activity and the 
higher-order activity of managing that work (neither of which is itself 
a corporate enterprise), so full-blooded action comprises both a basic 
activity and the higher-order activity of controlling it (neither of which 
is itself an action). 
* * * 
This analysis of action suggests how action might have a constitutive 
goal. According to the analysis, various actions involve various behav- 
iors-directed, in many cases, at various goals-but they also share 
an additional, higher-order activity, the activity of consciously direct- 
ing these behaviors. This activity is constitutive of action, in the sense 
that its addition is what makes a full-blooded action out of a merely 
reflexive or unintentional movement. If this higher-order activity en- 
tails the pursuit of a goal, then there may indeed be a constitutive goal 
of action.48 
What I have in mind here is not an ulterior goal or aim toward 
which behavior is consciously directed, as a corporation's work activity 
might be managed toward the end of maximizing profits. The execu- 
tive officers can still manage the work of a corporation without having 
the goal of profit maximization, in particular, and so this goal is not 
itself essential to work's being performed under management. Simi- 
larly, a goal toward which behavior is consciously directed may not be 
48. I have elsewhere presented an independent argument for this thesis ("What 
Happens When Someone Acts?"). The idea that practical reason has motives of its own, 
directed at the control of one's behavior, is contained in the theory of motivation 
attributed to Plato by John Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Motivation," History of 
Philosophy Qyarterly 1 (1984): 3-2 1. 
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essential to the behavior's being consciously directed, insofar as behav- 
ior might be consciously directed at other goals or no goal in particular. 
What I have in mind is a goal that must be pursued if behavior 
is to be consciously directed at all. This goal will not be one of the 
agent's ends-in-view, nor will it be something on which those ends 
converge. Rather, it will be something whose pursuit is ancillary to 
theirs-something whose pursuit transforms them, from outcomes 
sought unconsciously or reflexively, into ends at which action is con- 
sciously directed. 
THE CONSTITUTIVE GOAL OF ACTION 
What is this goal? A hint lies in the fact that consciously controlling 
one's behavior is not something that one can do without aiming to.49 
Maybe, then, the aim without which there is no conscious control of 
behavior is simply the aim of being in conscious control of one's behav- 
ior. If so, then the constitutive aim of action will turn out, in Kantian 
fashion, to be autonomy. ? And considerations will turn out to qualify 
as reasons-also in Kantian fashion-by virtue of their relevance to 
our autonomy rather than their relevance to our interests or our 
good.51 
These remarks are merely suggestive at best, and this is not the 
place to develop them into a full account of autonomy or its role as 
the constitutive goal of action.52 I can only sketch how they might 
be developed. 
* * * 
My sketch begins with the conception of autonomy as conscious con- 
trol over one's behavior. Consciously controlling one's behavior in- 
49. Bernard Williams has pointed out to me that one can consciously control one's 
behavior while aiming not to-as, for example, when one unsuccessfully tries to let 
one's reflexes or instincts take over. But this point strikes me as compatible with my 
claim that one cannot consciously control one's behavior without aiming to. Trying not 
to control one's behavior involves a second-order goal, of relaxing one's first-order 
efforts at control. If one continues to control one's behavior while trying not to, the 
reason is that one continues to aim at controlling it while trying not to persist in that 
aim. (Remember that the aims under discussion here may be subagential. See pp. 
716-17, above). 
50. Thanks to Chris Korsgaard for publicly daring me to express this thought. 
51. Stephen Darwall has proposed a similar conception of reasons, under the name 
autonomist internalism' ("Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals," 
Nous 24 [1990]: 257-68). Of course, considerations may be relevant to our autonomy 
because of their relevance to our interests. The point is that their relevance to autonomy 
will be what makes them reasons for acting. 
52. See my Practical Reflection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); 
and "The Story of Rational Action," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993): 229-54. 
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volves two elements: being conscious of one's behavior and controlling 
it. How are these elements connected? 
One possibility is that they aren't connected at all. Conscious con- 
trol might just be the sum of two independent elements, control over 
what one is doing and consciousness of what one is doing. Another 
possibility is that exercising control over one's behavior is what brings 
it to consciousness. One might control what one is doing and thereby 
become conscious of that behavior. 
The problem with these possibilities is that they would leave an 
agent's knowledge of his behavior dependent on the usual inbound chan- 
nels, such as perception of the behavior itself or introspection on the 
process by which it is directed. And as many philosophers have noted, 
an agent's knowledge of his behavior is not receptive knowledge: an 
agent knows what he is doing, as they say, without observation.53 
The work of these philosophers points to a third possibility for 
the relation between self-control and self-awareness. Maybe conscious- 
ness of what one is doing is that by which one exerts control. Con- 
sciously controlling one's behavior would then be-notjust controlling 
it and also, or thereby, becoming conscious of it-but rather having 
a controlling consciousness of one's behavior, a guiding awareness of 
what one is doing. This possibility would account not only for an 
agent's self-control but also for the quality of his self-awareness, since 
his knowledge of what he was doing would be, so to speak, directive 
rather than receptive knowledge.54 
* * * 
But how can knowledge be directive? For the answer, let me return 
to my earlier account of cognition. (I'll give the answer in this section 
and then illustrate it in the next.) 
Consciousness or knowledge must be a cognitive state, and so it 
must involve regarding propositions as true rather than as to be made 
53. See Anscombe, Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 3; Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual 
Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 8. See also Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1967), secs. 627 ff. 
54. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is 
"the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 
1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought 
and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough 
[London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that 
was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated 
Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, 
and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dor- 
drecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25. 
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true. It must also be a serious cognitive state, regarding propositions 
as true in an attempt thereby to get the truth right. Indeed, the success 
that's implied in the concept of consciousness or knowledge is success 
in this very attempt, to regard as true what really is true. 
But there are two ways of attempting to regard as true, or accept, 
what really is true. One way is to accept a proposition in response to 
its being true; the other is to accept a proposition in such a way as to 
make it true. Note that the latter method does not entail regarding 
the proposition as to be made true. It entails attempting to make the 
proposition true by regarding it as such, but attempting to make a 
proposition true by regarding it as true is quite different from regard- 
ing it as to be made true. The proposition is regarded as fact, not 
faciendum, and so it is accepted, in a cognitive rather than conative 
attitude. What's more, the proposition is accepted seriously, not hypo- 
thetically or frivolously. For in attempting to accept something so as 
to make it true, one attempts to reach the position of accepting a 
genuine truth, no less than when one attempts to accept something 
in response to its being true. In either case, one's acceptance aims at 
correspondence between what's regarded as true and what is true, 
and so it is a serious cognitive attitude, whose success deserves to be 
called knowledge.55 
How can one regard a proposition as true in such a way as to 
make it true? Well, when one accepts a proposition in response to its 
truth, one registers the influence of evidence and other reasons for 
belief, thereby manifesting an inclination to conform one's acceptance 
to the facts. Accepting a proposition in such a way as to make it true 
would simply require a converse inclination, to conform the facts to 
55. Here I am expanding on two themes that I have discussed elsewhere. First, I 
am expanding an earlier critique of the traditional notion of direction of fit (in my 
"Guise of the Good"). In my view, this notion conflates two different distinctions. 
One is the distinction between the cognitive and the conative-the distinction between 
accepting, or regarding as true and approving, or regarding as to be made true. The 
other is a distinction between the receptive and the directive, which are two different 
ways of attempting to accept what's true-namely, by accepting so as to reflect the 
truth, and by accepting so as to create the truth. If these distinctions are conflated 
under the heading 'direction of fit', then one and the same mental state can appear to 
have two different directions of fit, since a subject can attempt to accept what's true by 
accepting something so as to make it true. The resulting state is cognitive rather than 
conative, but directive rather than receptive: it's directive cognition. I would claim that 
this state of directive cognition is the state of intending to act. This is the second theme 
on which I am currently expanding. In the past, I have said that an intention is a self- 
fulfilling and self-referring belief (Practical Reflection, chap. 4; see also "How to Share an 
Intention," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 [1997]). The present discussion 
explains why I call it a belief, but also why I can dispense with that label. What matters 
is that intention is a state of directive cognition, not whether that state should be 
called belief. 
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one's acceptance. And one can indeed be inclined to conform the facts 
to one's acceptance, if the proposition accepted is about one's own 
behavior. One need only be inclined to do what one accepts that one 
will do. If one has this inclination, then accepting that one will do 
something can be a way of making this proposition true, and it can 
therefore be an attempt at accepting the truth. 
* * * 
This admittedly convoluted proposal can be applied to the contrast 
between your reflexively and intentionally catching that glass. In both 
cases, your desire to save the glass causes your hand to extend. In both 
cases, you're aware of this causal sequence, since you're aware of 
extending your hand in order to save the glass. But in only one of the 
cases is your knowledge directive, or your behavior autonomous. 
When you extend your hand reflexively, you react before you 
know it, but then you observe your reaction. Extending your hand in 
order to save the glass causes you to accept the proposition that you're 
doing so. When you react intentionally, however, acceptance precedes 
behavior: you accept that you'll extend your hand to save the glass, 
and this acceptance is what prompts you to do so. 
In the latter case as well as the former, your acceptance is an 
attempt to accept something true. You're not just hypothesizing or 
fantasizing that you'll extend your hand: you're seriously regarding it 
as true that you will extend it. Of course, your acceptance of this 
proposition is not an attempt to accept something that's true anteced- 
ently; it's an attempt to accept something whose truth will follow as a 
result. But it is not therefore less serious as an attempt to accept a 
truth. If the proposition accepted comes true, then its acceptance is 
a cognitive success-an instance of directive knowledge. 
In sum, instead of reacting before you know it, you react after 
and because you know it, and that's what makes your behavior an 
autonomous action. You act autonomously because you extend your 
hand in, and out of, a knowledge of what you're doing. 
* * * 
But why would your extending a hand to save the glass result from 
your accepting that you would do so? 
Suppose that you have an inclination toward being in conscious 
control of your next move. This inclination will inhibit you from doing 
anything out of other motives until you've accepted that you're going 
to-precisely so that you'll do it only after and because you know it, 
and hence under conscious control. Once you accept that you're going 
to do something, however, the inclination toward being in conscious 
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control will reinforce your other motives for doing it, since doing what 
you've accepted you'll do is what puts consciousness in control. Your 
inclination toward conscious control is thus converted, from an inhibi- 
tion against doing something into a motive in favor of doing it, by 
your accepting that you'll do it. Accepting that you'll extend your hand 
to save the glass can therefore prompt you to do so. 
Here, then, is how autonomy can serve as the constitutive goal 
of action. The goal-directed movement of your hand comes under 
your conscious control because it is prompted by your accepting that 
you will perform such a movement. And it is prompted by that accep- 
tance because of your inclination toward conscious control of what 
you're doing-which is just an inclination toward autonomy. Your 
movement thus becomes autonomous precisely by manifesting your 
inclination toward autonomy; and in becoming autonomous, it be- 
comes a full-blooded action. A full-blooded action is therefore behavior 
that manifests your inclination toward autonomy, just as a belief is a 
cognitive attitude that manifests your inclination toward the truth. 
* * * 
My view is that your inclination toward the constitutive goal of action 
also mediates the influence of your reasons for acting, just as your 
inclination toward the truth mediates the influence of your reasons 
for belief. Your reasons for acting can be displayed as the premises 
of a practical inference: 
I want to save that glass. 
I could save the glass by extending my hand. 
So I'll extend my hand. 
Since the premises of this inference are about how to fulfill a desire 
of yours, they sound like reasons that Williams would call internal. 
But in my view, they don't influence you in quite the way that internal 
reasons are supposed to. 
Here is how internal reasons are supposed to work. The first 
premise of your inference is about a desire of yours: "I want to save 
that glass." The second premise is about the means to the object of 
that desire: "I could save the glass by extending my hand." The desire 
mentioned in the first premise and the belief expressed in the second 
combine to motivate the action mentioned in your conclusion: "So I'll 
extend my hand." According to the internalist tradition, this process 
of motivation is the very process whereby reasons for acting exert their 
influence as reasons. 
This conception of how reasons exert their influence encourages a 
particular reading of the statements displayed above. Since the influence 
of reasons is conceived as the motivational influence of desire and belief, 
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and since the second premise expresses the operative belief, the first 
premise is read as expressing the associated desire.56 Similarly, the conclu- 
sion is sometimes read as expressing-or standing in for-the action 
itself, which is said to be the real conclusion of your inference.57 The 
three displayed statements are thus interpreted as expressions of your 
reasons and of the action that they influence you to perform. 
I don't dispute the traditional account of how desire and belief 
motivate behavior. My quarrel is with the claim that when desire and 
belief motivate behavior, they exert the influence of reasons.58 You ex- 
tend your hand, I agree, out of a desire for something and a belief about 
how to attain it. But you can extend your hand out of a desire and belief 
even when you do so reflexively, without knowing what you're doing or 
why, and hence without the benefit of practical reasoning. 
In my view, extending your hand out of a desire and belief is the 
underlying behavior over which you may or may not exercise conscious 
control-the underlying work that may or may not come under your 
executive management. And practical reasoning is the process by 
which you exercise conscious control over this activity in some cases but 
not others. If you extend your hand without any guiding knowledge of 
what you're doing, then even though your behavior is motivated by a 
desire and belief, it isn't under your conscious control, and so it isn't 
a full-blooded action. Your behavior amounts to a full-blooded action 
only when it is performed in, and out of, a knowledge of what you're 
doing-or, as I have said, after and because you know it.59 
* * * 
This view of practical reasoning encourages a different interpretation 
of the statements displayed above. The first premise expresses a desire- 
56. See Davidson, "Intending," in Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 83-102, p. 86. 
Because Davidson thinks that this premise should express your desire, he would re- 
formulate it, from "I want to save that glass" to "Saving that glass would be desirable." 
57. Davidson, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" p. 32; and "Intending," 
pp. 98-99. 
58. This quarrel is a continuation of my "Guise of the Good" and "What Happens 
When Someone Acts?" 
59. Note that in my account, your autonomy isn't an ability to control the motions of 
your hand; it's an ability to control your behavior, which is bodily motion psychologically 
understood, in terms of its motivation. Even a robot can control whether its hand moves. 
It takes an autonomous agent to control whether he moves his hand out of a desire to 
save a glass. The object of autonomous control is thus the entire behavior, comprising 
motivation as well as movement. The same point can be put in (somewhat) Kantian 
terms, as follows. Acting autonomously isn't just moving in accordance with one's idea 
of a movement; it's acting in accordance with one's idea of a law-in this case, the law 
of motivation. 
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based reason, in my view, but the reason expressed is not the desire 
itself. The reason expressed by "I want to save that glass" is your 
recognition of the desire. 
This recognition is a reason because, together with the belief ex- 
pressed in your second premise, it forms a potentially guiding aware- 
ness of what you would be doing in extending your hand. The aware- 
ness that you want to save the glass, and that extending your hand 
would save it, puts you in a position to frame a piece of directive 
knowledge-"I'm extending my hand in order to save the glass"-a 
proposition that you can now make true by accepting it. Your aware- 
ness of the desire thus presents the behavior of extending your hand 
in a form prepared for your conscious control, as a potential object 
of your directive grasp. It presents the behavior, if you will, as fit 
for (en)action, given the constitutive aim of action, just as theoretical 
reasons present a proposition as fit for belief, given the constitutive 
aim of belief. 
This view of practical reasoning requires far more elaboration 
and defense than I can offer here. Its only relevance to this article is 
that it implements the compromise that I favor between internalism 
and externalism. For according to this view, even desire-based reasons 
for acting derive their influence from an inclination other than the 
desires on which they are based. 
* * * 
The reasons displayed above are desire based in the sense that they 
mention your desire to save the glass and the means to fulfilling that 
desire. Yet their influence as reasons is not mediated by the desire that 
they mention. 
Your desire to save the glass does exert a motivational influence 
in this example. But its influence as a motive contributes to the 
underlying activity of extending your hand in order to save the 
glass-the activity that comes under the control of your practical 
reasoning. And the contribution of your reasons to the control of 
this activity is distinct from the contribution of your motives to the 
activity itself. 
What exerts the influence of a reason in this example is the recog- 
nition that you want to save the glass. And this recognition doesn't 
influence you by engaging your desire to save the glass. Wanting to 
save the glass is a motive that can be engaged by considerations about 
how to save it, not by the recognition that you want to. The recognition 
that you want to save the glass engages a different inclination, your 
inclination toward autonomy-toward behaving in, and out of, a 
knowledge of what you're doing. And it thereby exerts a rational 
influence distinct from the motivational influence of the desire that 
it's about. 
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* * * 
Now, if desire-based reasons derive their influence from something 
other than the desires on which they are based, then perhaps the same 
influence is available to considerations that aren't based on desires at 
all. Perhaps considerations that aren't about your inclinations can still 
provide potentially directive knowledge. 
Such considerations would still have the influence of reasons, by 
virtue of their capacity to engage your inclination toward autonomy. 
But they wouldn't depend for their influence on the inclinations that 
differentiate you from any other agent, and they wouldn't be about 
such inclinations, either. They might therefore be reasons that Will- 
iams would call external. 
My thesis, in any case, is that reasons for acting shouldn't be 
classified as external or internal, since they don't conform to the as- 
sumptions underwriting the use of these terms. A reason applies only 
to those whom it can influence, but its application is not therefore 
limited to agents of a particular temperament. The inclination that 
makes one susceptible to a reason for acting is just the inclination that 
makes one an agent. 
